ABSTRACT: In this paper, I reconstruct Hobbes' theory of self-love. I then examine Hume's arguments that (i) self-love does not properly account for moral behavior and (ii) self-love is unnecessary for moral theory. I argue that Hobbesian self-love can account for both of Hume's objections. Further, I use an analysis of Hobbes' Deliberation to show, contra Hume, that self-love does not entail a lack of intention in moral action.
values and praises what is beneficial to him and his fellow men because of his love for humanity. Hume's theory suggests that "desires and aversions themselves are the main motivating forces" of moral behavior because of their role in moral evaluation. 6 However, unlike Hobbes, Hume posits that these desires and aversions are prompted by external events according to man's benevolence, including more specifically sentiments of sympathy, humanity, and natural concern for the welfare of others.
Both Hume and Hobbes believe that moral virtues are based in utility and underscored by the passions. However, their views diverge when it comes to accounting for the mechanisms that motivate adherence to utility, i.e. how and why the passions are related to moral behavior. Although Hobbes does not make an explicit argument for self-love, his argument promoting the notion can be presented as follows: notions of desire and pleasure proceed from nature or experience, and desire and pleasure necessarily relate to what is good for the preservation and happiness of the individual;
and since what we consider to be moral virtues are ultimately derived from notions of expected desire and pleasure, it must follow that moral virtues kind]", whereas vices contribute to "the misery of mankind." 22 From these observations, egoists then discern the existence of a "union of interest"
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between the public and private as simply "modifications of self-love."
23
Hume agrees with philosophers like Hobbes that, "the interest of the individual is, in general, so closely connected with that of the community," but it does not follow from this that all interest for others is nothing but redirected self-love. 24 All humans have some degree of concern for public interest, and it is this aspect of human nature that Hume sees as problematic for an egoist account. Hume sees self-love as a theory that renders public interest, when separate from our own, "entirely indifferent to us," which we can easily observe to be false.
25
It should be noted that Hume's argument does not directly engage Hobbes, although his argument is likely a response to a theory of self-love like that presented by Hobbes. The principle of self-love that Hume argues against is not exactly the same principle that Hobbes advocates; however, the basic principle that all actions are motivated by self-interest is held in common. Hume's argument against the version of self-love that he presents rings true in many ways. However, due to its narrow conception, by itself it does not seem to say much. Hobbes' version of self-love is more robust than Hume's, and when the two are pitted against one another, we can gain a greater understanding of the nature of moral action.
In essence, Hume's argument against self-love can be divided into two main points: (a) the principle of self-love is not a moral principle because it is limited in its ability to account for moral behavior (and thus it is faulty); and (b) it is unnecessary for moral theory. First, Hume argues that self-love is limited in calling upon "the voice of nature and experi- theory of self-love is faulty because (i) of instances in which the interest of the individual is either separate or wholly opposed to that of the public,
"and yet we observe the moral sentiment to continue" in the interest of the public despite its opposition to private interest; 27 and (ii) spectators enjoy and praise the virtues or moral actions of others even though it has no effect whatsoever of the spectators themselves, and thus yields no benefit for the spectators.
28
Hume argues (i) with examples in which there is disunity between public and private interest. Self-love cannot account for a situation in which a mother, for example, sacrifices her own interest and well-being to take care of her sick child. 29 In this case, the private interest of the mother is at odds with the comparatively public interest of the child, and yet the mother's moral sentiment leads her to attend to her child's interest. Hume cites this as a case of benevolence divorced from self-love; 30 for it seems that compromising one's health and wellbeing for that of someone else cannot be rooted in self-love.
In Hume's second objection (ii) to the scope of self-love, he argues that "it can never be self-love which renders the prospect of [another's virtuous character] agreeable to us, the spectators, and prompts our esteem and approbation," because there is nothing in it for the spectator. view." 36 This is not to say that the mother is not acting morally, or that she lacks genuine concern for her child. In Hobbes' view, benevolence is the "desire of good to another," so the mother can indeed be said to have acted benevolently in this situation.
37
As for situations such as that described in (ii), which may seem to lie outside the realm of self-love, Hobbes' self-love may account for them in terms of rational desires. For Hobbes, we approve of moral behavior even when we are not directly involved because we are always in involved on some level. Our approval perpetuates the existence of virtues, which allow us as individuals to have security, and from there, happiness. Hobbes' construction of moral rules, which might be compared to Hume's virtues, holds that even people who lack a concern for others "should be rationally motivated to obey [moral rules]" regarding the welfare of others because it is in their best interest as members of a society. 38 Although approbation may not be a moral rule, the idea is that individuals are inclined to appreciate the moral behavior of others because it contributes to the welfare of How We Are Moral society as a whole, therein benefiting the individual as a member of that society.
Hume would likely object to this idea for its reduction and simplicity, and claim that it is contrary to the way people think: people do not consciously evaluate whether and how an outside event could possibly end up contributing to their own good before making a positive moral evaluation-they feel good about it immediately. Hobbes might respond to this objection by arguing that, as mentioned above, people desire and enjoy things that aim at their own good. This does not mean that an individual must be thinking about the way in which a given observation contributes to his personal good, but rather that it is his instinct to be attracted to it, and because a moral society is in an individual's best interest, the desire for a stranger to behave morally is rational.
In the second half of his argument, Hume claims that the theory of self-love is unacceptable because it is unnecessary for moral theory. For
Hume, morality can be accounted for by benevolence and utility and it is useless and even detrimental to moral theory to "seek for abstruse and remote systems" to explain the motivation for moral behavior. 39 He claims that if the principle of self-love were true it would mean that "while all of us, at bottom, pursue only our private interest, we wear these fair disguises," such as that of the friend, the lover, the helpful neighbor, and so on. benevolent and why we care for and consider others. Hume "argues that passions and sentiments underlie our evaluations" and execution of moral behavior; 42 Hobbes merely takes this idea a step further to argue that selfinterest underlies the way in which the passions and sentiments drive us toward evaluation or executing a certain moral behavior the way we do.
This step is necessary for moral theory because it provides an accurate explanation of the mechanism underlying moral behavior. Further, this step is important for Hume's moral theory because it can account for the roles of utility and approbation where Hume's Benevolence falls short.
According to Beauchamp's reading of Hume, "benevolent acts are directed at promoting the good" of others as based in the sentiments of sympathy and humanity.
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to the agent because of the obvious benefits of virtues. This does not mean that all moral acts must be performed with the consciously selfish motive of "good-for-me." What it does mean is that humans desire good for others, and that satisfying this desire is good for the individual.
Here, it seems that Hume's theory must give way to Hobbesian self-love. Even if the end of moral action "nowise affects us," the approval or the expectation of approval associated with the action must ultimately become the end of a given moral action, and thus acting in the name of utility can only be motivated by self-interest. 44 Hume might respond by arguing that it would be false to reduce "all our concern for the public" to "a concern for our own happiness and preservation." 45 However, what Hume is missing here is the all-pervasive idea of identity of interest. In Hobbes, utility and approval create the identity of interest between public and private sectors, so that any moral act performed in the interest of another is at bottom performed because it is also in the agent's interest on some level.
Thus, it is not a coincidence that benevolent acts are met with approbation because we only know what virtues are by the public approval they elicit, so it cannot be said that we act virtuously without the expectation of approval. For all of these reasons, it seems that Hume's principle of utility is more compatible with Hobbes' self-love than Hume's benevolence.
The remaining objection Hume raises to self-love is that it removes intention from moral behavior. If self-love is the motive for all actions, then making a "moral" decision can be compared to seeking food when we have hunger or drinking water when we have thirst. love cannot be accounted for by an automatic, self-serving instinct-they require many more dimensions. Thus, the concept of deliberation and its role in voluntary action allow for the importance of intention by placing evaluations and actions motivated by self-interest in the domain of moral consideration.
Concluding Thoughts
Hume and Hobbes are more compatible than what initially appears to be the case. When considered fairly, it seems that Hobbes' self-love is not a terribly shocking conclusion. However, Hobbes' theory is by no means flawless: can desire be divorced from self-interest? If it can, then Hume may be right and Hobbes' theory may find itself void of meaning. There are many more objections to psychological egoism that Hobbesian self-love may not be able to hold up against. However, Hobbes' self-love is only a non-normative theory, and even if self-interest is the motivation for human behavior, it does not necessarily imply that it ought to be. Hume's moral theory may be better suited as a normative theory that says that benevolence should be the basis of moral action. In any case, it seems that neither Hobbes nor Hume can be said to be completely right or completely wrong in their respective accounts of morality-neither philosopher helps us ascertain distinct moral rightness or wrongness. However, their theories do lend themselves to one another, and by finding a common ground between them, we may be getting close to a theory that encompasses both the accurate and the ideal in moral theory. v
